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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION
AFTER Baker v. Sadiclc A PROPOSED STATUTORY
REFORM*
I. INTRODUCTION
Binding arbitration' is a dispute resolution process in which
contracting parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator for
final determination. The binding nature of arbitration is vital to its
effectiveness as a substitute for litigation. The rights of contracting
parties to sue in court are voluntarily and permanently forfeited' in
exchange for a swifter, private and less expensive determination of
their claims, allowing for many possible remedies."
Until recently, punitive damages' were not awarded' in Califor-
nia arbitration proceedings. The California Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Baker v. Sadick,' however, permitted arbitrators to award
punitive damages. Baker reinforces California's legislative and judi-
cial policies favoring punitive damage recoveries using arbitration as
an alternative dispute resolution process."
© 1987 by Erin Parks
* The author wishes to express her sincere gratitude to Lisa and Tim, Steven and her
parents for their endless support and encouragement. Special thanks to her associate, Bob
Miller of Faisant, Miller & Gregory, Menlo Park, California, for his concern and expert
advice on contract law and arbitration.
1. "Binding arbitration" refers to an arbitration process in which there is no appeal
from the award except in strictly limited circumstances. Comment, Awarding Punitive Dam-
ages in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 312, 314 n.14 (1984). For a
discussion of appealable circumstances, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
2. An "arbitrator" is an impartial person chosen by the parties to resolve a dispute
between them. The arbitrator is vested with the power to make a final determination concern-
ing the issue(s) in controversy, bound only by his or her own discretion, and not by rules of
law or equity. S. GiFs, LAW DICTIONARY 15 (1975).
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 314. See R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT
You NEED TO KNOW 17 (1980).
4. For examples of the advantages of arbitration, see infra text accompanying notes 26-
46.
5. In common usage "punitive damages" refers to "compensation in excess of actual
damages; a form of punishment to the wrongdoers and excess enhancement of the in-
jured .. " S. GIFIs, LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 52.
6. The term "award" is used in this comment to differentiate between arbitral decisions
(awards) and judicial judgments.
7. 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987) (providing for punitive dam-
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The test articulated in Baker for determining whether punitive
arbitral awards are appropriate is not a sufficient substitute for stat-
utory guidelines. Because punitive damages are usually quite severe,'
criminal and civil courts provide procedural safeguards to protect lit-
igants from possible excessive and/or unwarranted punishment.10
Arbitration, however, has no inherent procedural safeguards to pro-
tect parties against punitive damage claims.1"
The threat of punitive damage awards without safeguards may
be too risky for some contracting parties. 2 The future success of ar-
bitration as a fair and just substitute for adjudication is threatened if
litigants choose not to submit to arbitration" or are forced into an
inherently unfair dispute resolution process." Relatively minor
change in California's General Arbitration Act 1" can rectify this po-
tential problem and preserve binding arbitration as a viable dispute
resolution alternative.
California and Federal policy suggest increased reliance on ar-
bitration for resolving disputes. 6 Accordingly, this comment com-
pares the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, and contrasts
the policy arguments for and against punitive damages. The com-
ment then presents and scrutinizes the California Court of Appeals
decision in Baker, the only California case to uphold an arbitrator's
award of punitive damages. An analysis of the lack of procedural
safeguards in the Act indicates the need for a statutory proposal to
limit the chances of unwarranted and/or excessive punitive damage
awards in arbitration proceedings. Therefore, statutory amendments
are proposed to add safeguards where punitive damages are awarded
against defendants arbitrating under the Act. In particular, amend-
ments would empower arbitrators with the authority to enforce dis-
ages). See also infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 408, 426-29 (1967) [hereinafter P.D. Defendant]. For examples of severe fines, see
infra note 139 and accompanying text.
10. See generally P.D. Defendant, supra note 9, at 408-35 (advocating procedural safe-
guards for punitive damage defendants: the right to jury trial, the right to confront adverse
witnesses, the right to assistance of counsel, protection against excessive fines by judicial re-
view, and strong burdens of proof for plaintiffs).
11. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter the
Act]. The Act is found under Title 9 which was added in 1961. Title 9 was derived from
former Title 10, "Of Arbitrations," enacted in 1872.
16. See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
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covery procedures, provide for a mandatory panel of three arbitra-




The use of arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolu-
tion is favored at both state and federal levels. Support is indicated in
policy statements dictated by lawmakers and the courts.
1. California Public Policy
The California Legislature encourages the use of arbitration as
an alternative means of dispute resolution.1" The Legislature's posi-
tion is illustrated by a modern arbitration statute enforcing agree-
ments to arbitrate existing and future controversies."i California
courts also maintain a strong judicial policy favoring arbitration be-
cause arbitration is often less expensive and more expeditious than
litigation, and it relieves court congestion. 9 The California Supreme
Court acknowledged in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals"
that there have been changes in policy and attitude favoring
arbitration.2"
2. Federal Policy
California's pro-arbitration policy is strengthened by a concur-
ring federal policy.2" The United States Supreme Court held in
17. See generally CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
18. Id. See also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ARBITRATION & THE LAW,
147 app. (1984) (listing all modern arbitration statutes) [hereinafter AAA].
19. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 413, 416, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493
(1979); Wheeler v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 355, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782
(1976). Both Hawkins and Wheeler were medical malpractice actions where the courts stated
that California favors arbitration over litigation as a means of settling disputes.
20. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976). The court reversed the
order of the lower court denying enforcement of an arbitration provision and ordered the court
to grant a motion to compel the arbitration in a medical malpractice dispute where plaintiff's
health plan contained an arbitration clause.
21. Id. at 706, 552 P.2d at 1182, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The court stated, "decisions
confirm the self-evident fact that arbitration has become an accepted and favored method of
resolving disputes .. " Id.
22. See AAA, supra note 18, at 10. Congress promotes arbitration through the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). See also Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:
The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272, 272 n.1 (1978) [hereinafter
Workable Rule].
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Southland Corp. v. Keatinges that the states can no longer force
parties to go to court when contracting parties have agreed to arbi-
trate claims if the contract involves interstate commercial transac-
tions." ' The reason for maintaining such an adamant federal policy
towards arbitration is most eloquently expressed by Chief Justice,
Warren Burger:
One thing an appellate judge learns very quickly is that a large
part of all litigation in the courts is an exercise in futility and
frustration. The anomaly is that there are better ways of resolv-
ing private disputes, and we must in the public interest move
toward taking a large volume of private conflicts out of the
courts and into the channels of arbitration. 5
California law, federal law and legal authorities recognize the
viability of arbitration as a substitute for litigation. An overview of
the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration lends support to the
degree of recognition given to the process. The comparison also high-
lights situations where disadvantages could override the benefits of
the process in the near future.
3. Advantages of Arbitration
The advantages of arbitration make it a useful substitute for
traditional litigation. Generally, arbitration's primary benefit to soci-
ety is that it reduces court overcrowding." Also, the use of expert
decision makers, particularly in commercial disputes, is advantageous
compared to judges and juries. Speedier proceedings,27 often at lower
costs,26 are usually not afforded by litigation. Finally, hearings are
private29  and arbitration offers more remedial options than
litigation."0
23. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The United States Supreme Court overruled a California Su-
preme Court decision holding that statutory claims were not arbitrable.
24. Id. at 10-11. See Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l Inc., 598 F.
Supp. 353, 359-62 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (upholding arbitrator's award of punitive damages be-
cause federal policy does not prohibit parties to a contract from vesting arbitrators with the
authority to consider punitive damages claims for fraud).
25. R. CoU.sON, supra note 3, at 7.
26. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON, JR. & P. SZANTO, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
PROCESSES IN EvoLUTrON 10 (1984) [hereinafter MARKS].
27. See H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 340 (tentative ed. 1958). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 38-41.
28. See H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 27, at 340. See also infra text accompanying
notes 42-46.
29. See H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 27, at 343.
30. Hollering, Remedies in Arbitration, 20 FORUM 516, 516-17 (1984). Available rem-
[Vol. 27
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In particular, arbitration proceedings are often presided over by
experts in particular commercial fields."1 The selection of arbitrators
is the choice of the contracting parties. 2 The parties either indepen-
dently appoint industrial or commercial specialists with technical
knowledge, or they agree to abide by the decisions of trade associa-
tions. 8 Business persons appreciate a result which fairly reflects cus-
toms of the trade.3
A private forum is of equal importance to the business world.
Confidentiality is critical to participants in arbitration 5 who take
comfort in knowing that reputations will not be damaged through
unfavorable publicity. 6 Moreover, a private proceeding fosters an
environment where disputants with ongoing relationships can rectify
disagreements speedily, preserving friendliness and good will. 7
Commercial disputes usually require speedy resolution to pre-
serve or diminish the negative impact on contractual time schedules.
Arbitration proceedings are most often shorter than the judicial pro-
cess38 because appeals are strictly limited 9 and arbitrators' decisions
are generally final.40 Finality coincides with most parties' desire to
avoid extensive appellate adjudication 1  and also relieves court
congestion.
edies include: liquidated, consequential or punitive damages; discovery; attorneys' fees; interest;
interim relief; specific performance; or other equitable remedies.
31. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 7.
32. Id. at 13. See also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
33. R. CoULsoN, supra note 3, at 9. Textile and construction industries are examples of
fields with trade associations which depend heavily on arbitration to resolve disputes.
34. H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 27, at 342.
35. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 7.
36. Id.
37. H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 27, at 341.
38. A sophisticated statistical analysis of the overall length of arbitrations is not pres-
ently available. However, the AAA did a recent nationwide survey of the last 400 construction
cases taken prior to its annual National Construction Industry Arbitration Committee Meet-
ing. From 1982 to 1986, fifty-five percent of the surveyed cases that ended with awards took
an average of 200 days (6 1/2 months) from filing to completion. Report prepared by the
American Arbitration's Department of Case Administration for National Construction Indus-
try Arbitration Committee Meeting (Oct. 30, 1986).
By comparison, for approximately fifty percent of 948 comparable cases disposed of by the
federal courts between July 1, 1983 and June 30, 1984, the median time from filing to disposi-
tion was 9 months. Seventeen months was the median time of disposition for the two percent
that went to trial. Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, 7 AM. LAW.
No. 1, at 107, 110, Jan-Feb. 1985. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 314.
39. See H. HART & A. SACHS, supra note 27, at 347. See infra notes 85-109 and
accompanying text.
40. Comment, supra note 1, at 315. See also R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 7.
41. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 26. See also Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbi-
tration: A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698 (1952).
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Not only does arbitration save time, but it also is often less ex-
pensive than litigation. 42 Informal technical procedures and eviden-
tiary rules reduce arbitration costs for all parties.4 As a result of
decreased costs,44 there is increasing access to a dispute resolution
mechanism for poorer members of society. 6 Arbitration is particu-
larly less expensive for losing parties because excessive jury awards
are eliminated."
California's legal community supports the aforementioned ad-
vantages. 47 However, an increasingly controversial advantage of ar-
bitration is the broad variety of remedies available; the range of re-
lief even exceeds that which is available to the courts."' Under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, "any remedy or relief which the arbitrator deems just and equi-
table and within the scope of the agreement of the parties," is availa-
ble in arbitration.' 9
4. Disadvantages of Arbitration
There are several problems inherent in common arbitration.50
As outlined below, the first disadvantage of arbitration is that it lacks
precedent. Second, judicial review is severely limited. Third, infor-
mal evidentiary procedures circumvent accurate award determina-
tions. Finally, several other safeguards existing in civil proceedings
are absent in arbitration.
Arbitration proceedings often do not provide precedential
value. 1 Arbitrators are not required to submit written opinions, 2
even though in some instances precedents are desirable and neces-
42. See Comment, supra note 1, at 315.
43. Id.
44. Arbitration specialist, Michael Blutrich, of New York's Weiss, Blutrich, Falcon &
Miller law firm, claims that his fees are fifty to sixty percent lower than litigation costs.
Charles Resnick, general counsel of Raytheon, and Charles Whitehall, general counsel of Gen-
eral Mills, Inc., insists that arbitration is more economical. Lyons, supra note 38, at 110.
45. See MARKS, supra note 26, at 10.
46. See Comment, supra note 1, at 315.
47. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); Hawkins, 89
Cal. App. 3d at 416, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 493; Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 355, 133 Cal. Rptr.
at 782; Madden, 17 Cal. 3d at 706, 552 P.2d at 1182, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
48. Hollering, supra note 30, at 516.
49. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION § 42 (1977).
50. The term "common arbitration" in this comment refers to non-statutory arbitration
processes. Its use in this manner helps distinguish between arbitration under the General Arbi-
tration Act in California and arbitration in general.
51. Mentschikoff, supra note 41, at 709.
52. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 26.
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sary." Precedent creates authoritative foundations for judging future
conduct." ' Issues which would have immediate effects on society ne-
cessitate precedential rulings because society requires an "irreducible
minimum of certainty" to operate efficiently.5
Critics of binding arbitration feel that the absence of judicial
review is more problematic than lack of precedent. Since mistakes of
law are unreviewable, excessive punitive damage awards may be en-
forced although legally unwarranted."' Courts can only correct mis-
takes in the arbitration process.57 Determinations regarding evidence
sufficiency do not fall into this category, and thus are non-review-
able." Absence of review in situations where evidence does not sub-
stantiate the punitive award may contradict the Constitutional right
to appeal as applied in criminal law."
The disadvantage of limited judicial review is particularly rele-
vant considering the lack of formality in arbitration proceedings.60
Arbitrators admit practically any type of evidence,6 and discovery is
not customary in arbitration.62 Even where arbitrators have the
power to order discovery, their ability to enforce such discovery or-
ders is highly questionable.6" Lack of formal procedural safeguards,
such as enforceable discovery and technical evidentiary rules, makes
the issue of non-reviewability critical because the flexibility of the
53. Mentschikoff, supra note 41, at 709. Instances involving insurable risk must have
guidance as to the determination of all such cases. Examples of such guidance are: 1) requiring
that consideration move from the beneficiary of a letter of credit to the issuer; 2) not requiring
a check to contain an unconditional promise to be negotiable; and 3) determining that F.O.B.
means free on board. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. But see R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that precedents can be dan-
gerous "because they identify targets for the losing party to attack." Id.).
56. Workable Rule, supra note 22, at 287. In this comment, "legally unwarranted
awards" refers to those awards which are made but cannot be legally substantiated.
57. See R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 27. Examples of mistakes in the arbitration pro-
cess include acts of arbitrator misconduct, arbitrators exceeding authority, or failure to meet
statutory requirements of due process.
58. Id.
59. Comment, supra note 1, at 310. See also Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History,
Their Use & Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 8 (1980) ("[b]ecause
punitive damages serve to punish, they must be considered penal; fundamental constitutional
criminal safeguards therefore must be applied fully." Id.).
60. See R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 17.
61. Id. at 17, 19 ("[t]he general rule is to hear everything that will clarify the is-
sues . Id. " M ).
62. Id. at 23.
63. AAA, supra note 18, at 49. Whether arbitrators may enforce discovery orders
through sanctions for failure to comply remains largely unanswered because few cases discuss
arbitrator-compelled disclosure and commentators have not reached a consensus on the topic of
discovery and arbitration.
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arbitration system does not provide a check on unwarranted and/or
excessive punitive damage awards.
In addition to the lack of precedent, restricted judicial review
and informal evidentiary procedures, arbitration requires no formal
pleadings. 4 All that is required is a statement of the nature of the
dispute and a possible answering statement." Ordinarily there are
no pretrial motions or examinations allowed.66
In contrast to the safeguards existing in civil courts, common
arbitration has no inherent procedural safeguards. 7 In addition to
judicial review, civil courts afford defendants five basic procedural
safeguards that arbitration generally does not: (1) formal pleadings;
(2) pretrial procedures (motions, discovery and examinations); (3)
trial by judge or jury; (4) technical evidentiary rules; and (5) deci-
sions according to the rules of law.6"
5. California Arbitration
California has attempted to rectify the total absence of proce-
dural safeguards through its General Arbitration Act.69 California
allows for limited pretrial procedures in certain instances. Arbitra-
tors may issue subpoenas,7 0 and take depositions for use as evidence,
but deposed information may not be used for discovery purposes.71
Discovery procedures are enforced to the same extent as in civil
courts only when there is an agreement to arbitrate "any dispute...
arising out of or resulting from any injury to, or death of a person
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. ' '7
Judges and juries are not part of the arbitration system. Arbi-
trating parties are only entitled to a hearing73 and notice of the hear-
64. Ladimer & Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, Programs, Cases,
653 INs. L.J. 335, 336 (1977) (comparing courts to arbitration systems in general).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Appendix.
68. Ladimer & Solomon, supra note 64, at 336.
69. CAL.. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
70. Id. at § 1282.6.
71. Id. at § 1283.
72. Id. at § 1283.1(a).
73. The Act provides:
(d) The parties to the arbitration are entitled to be heard, to present evi-
dence and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing, but rules of
evidence and rules of judicial procedure need not be observed. On request of any
party to the arbitration, the testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath.
d. at § 1282.2(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
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ing.7 ' Hearings are conducted by a neutral arbitrator or a panel of
arbitrators, 8 as specified in the arbitration clause." If the parties
have not agreed, the court will appoint a neutral arbitrator upon a
party's petition." The Act also provides the right to have counsel
present at the hearing.78
Judicial evidentiary rules are generally not applied in arbitra-
tion proceedings. 9 The arbitrator has sole discretion to determine
evidential relevancy and materiality." At arbitration hearings, all
relevant evidence may be admitted.8" The essence of arbitration re-
quires that arbitrators be free from the "formality of ordinary judi-
cial procedure."8 2 However, arbitrators may require conformity to
74. Smith v. Campbell & Facciolla, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 2d 134, 135, 20 Cal. Rptr. 606,
607 (1962) (court of appeal reversed superior court order confirming an arbitration award
"because the arbitrator did not give appellant notice of any hearing." Id.).
75. The Act defines the powers and duties of a neutral arbitrator:
Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides, or unless the parties to the
arbitration otherwise provide by an agreement which is not contrary to the arbi-
tration agreement as made or as modified by all of the parties thereto:
(a) The arbitration shall be by a single neutral arbitrator.
(b) If there is more than one arbitrator, the powers and duties of the arbitrators,
other than the powers and duties of a neutral arbitrator, may be exercised by a
majority of them if reasonable notice of all proceedings has been given to all
arbitrators.
(c) If there is more than one neutral arbitrator:
(1) The powers and duties of a neutral arbitrator may be exercised by a major-
ity of the neutral arbitrators.
(2) By unanimous agreement of the neutral arbitrators, such powers and duties
may be delegated to one of their number but the power to make or correct the
award may not be so delegated.
(d) If there is no neutral arbitrator, the powers and duties of a neutral arbitra-
tor may be exercised by a majority of the arbitrators.
CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 1282(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
76. An arbitration clause is a provision in a contract which represents a binding com-
mitment by both parties to resort to arbitration in the event that a dispute arises about the
meaning or application of the contract. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 12.
77. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). See infra note 202
and accompanying text.
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (West 1982.& Supp. 1986).
79. See supra notes 60-63, 73 and accompanying text.
80. F. Sage & Co. v. Alexander & Oviatt Corp., 138 Cal. App. 476, 479, 32 P.2d 655,
657 (1934). This court of appeal decision denied a motion to vacate and confirmed the findings
and award in an action to collect an unpaid balance on a contract because "Itihe arbitrators,
sitting as a jury, were the sole judges of the weight to be given to [the] testimony." Id. See also
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 520, 212 P.2d 233, 237 (1949). In a construction
dispute, the supreme court reversed a lower court order holding that respondents, having par-
ticipated in informal hearings by arbitrators without objection to admission of evidence, could
not attack the award.
82. Id. (quoting Canuso v. Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 307, 192 A. 133, 136 (1937)).
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civil rules of evidence, or the parties may so stipulate."8
California case law illustrates the degree of informality manifest
in arbitration proceedings. Arbitral awards are not bound by judicial
precedents nor statutory language; arbitrators may base their awards
on justice and equity principles." ' Therefore, successful claims made
in civil courts may be denied in arbitration proceedings and vice
versa. An award of punitive damages based upon an arbitrator's
sense of equity and justice may conflict with judicially established
standards and still not be amenable to judicial review.
Arbitration awards are presumed final and binding on matters
of fact and law85 unless otherwise expressly stated by the parties.
Nevertheless, any party may petition the court to confirm, correct or
vacate an award upon completing arbitration proceedings.8 An
award correction is only made, however, when there is an evident
error and the merits are not affected.87
A court will vacate an arbitral award upon certain grounds stat-
utorily provided for in the Act,88 and upon a showing of gross inade-
83. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 19.
84. Case v. Alperson, 181 Cal. App. 2d 759, 761, 5 Cal. Rptr. 635, 636 (1960). The
court of appeal confirmed an arbitration award in a contract dispute where parties to the
arbitration agreement could expect to "reap the advantages that flow from the use of that
nontechnical, summary procedure ... " and also be bound by an award not subject to judicial
review. Id.
85. Jones v. Kvistad, 19 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840, 97 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1971) (con-
firming arbitrator's award in dispute between owner and contractor concerning amount due on
contract); Canadian Indem. Co. v. Okin, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 707, 76 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904
(1969) (action to vacate an arbitration award denied upholding the validity of an arbitration
clause in a fire insurance policy).
86. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1294-1294.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
87. The Act outlines grounds for correction of award:
Subject to Section 1286.8, the court, unless it vacates the award pursuant to
Section 1286.2, shall correct the award and confirm it as corrected if the court
determines that:
(a) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (b) The
arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without af-
fecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or (c) The
award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
Id. at § 1286.6.
88. The Act provides grounds for vacation of award:
Subject to Section 1286.4, the court shall vacate the award if the court deter-
mines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
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quacy or excessiveness.8 9 Fraud or corruption of the arbitrators or of
the parties in procuring an award is a basis for vacating the award. 0
The following grounds are also sufficient: misconduct"1 or partiality
of an arbitrator,92 arbitrators exceeding powers established in the ar-
bitration or submission agreement,9" and refusals to postpone hear-
ings or hear material evidence.9 4 However, unsound reasoning is not
sufficient to vacate an award,95 nor can an award be set aside for
mistake of fact or law unless there is substantial prejudice to a party
in the proceeding.96
A court may order a rehearing in arbitration if the court vacates
an award.97 Resulting awards or those which are not vacated have
the status of a binding written contract between the parties. 8 An
award becomes enforceable in court once the parties petition the
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore
or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy
or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
Id. at § 1286.2.
89. See William B. Logan & Assocs. v. Monogram Precision Indus., 184 Cal. App. 2d
12, 16, 7 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (1960) (reversing lower court confirmation of an arbitration
award which allowed extrinsic evidence to increase the amount in controversy).
90. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
91. Id. at § 1286.2(c).
92. Johnston v. Security Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 839, 843-44, 86 Cal. Rptr. 133, 136(1970) (a ruling vacating an arbitration award was upheld where an arbitrator failed in his
legal duty to disclose any conflicts of interest).
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
94. Id. at § 1286.2(c).
95. See Los Angeles Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers v. Stan's Drive-
Ins Inc., 136 Cal. App. 2d 89, 94, 288 P.2d 286, 290 (1955) (affirming a judgment confirming
an arbitration award in a union contract dispute stating that unsound reasoning ("uncer-
tainty") may necessitate modification or correction but not reversal).
96. Accito v. Matmor Canning Co., 128 Cal. App. 2d 631, 634, 276 P.2d 34, 36 (1954)
(upholding confirmation of an arbitral award and the jurisdiction of the court to "entertain" a
motion for confirmation).
97. The Act contains a rehearing process:
If the award is vacated, the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators.
If the award is vacated on the grounds set forth in subdivision (d) or (e) of
Section 1286.2, the court with the consent of the parties to the court proceeding
may order a rehearing before the original arbitrators. If the arbitration agree-
ment requires that the award be made within a specified period of time, the
rehearing may nevertheless be held and the award made within an equal period
of time beginning with the date of the order for rehearing but only if the court
determines that the purpose of the time limit agreed upon by the parties to the
arbitration agreement will not be frustrated by the application of this provision.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1287 (West 1982).
98. "An award that has not been confirmed or vacated has the same force and effect as a
contract in writing between the parties to the arbitration." Id. at § 1287.6.
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court for confirmation and a final judgment is ordered." Judgments
are then subject to judicial review.
As a general rule, the merits of an arbitration proceeding are
not reviewable in a trial court.' A court will review the merits only
if a submission agreement provides for an award made according to
law' 01 or if a party raises the issue of illegality of the entire transac-
tion.10' At this point, the court will also determine if any of the con-
tract rights violate public policy. 08 If a party is still not satisfied, the
Act provides for appellate review104
The appellate court may only review the propriety of the arbi-
tration proceedings,10' not the merits."' It has been stated and re-
stated that "every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor
of [an arbitration] award."' 0 As a result, appellate courts will not
review contradictory evidence100 or improper testimonial claims.1 09
99. The Act states:
If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith.
The judgment so entered has the same force and effect as, and is subject to all
the provisions of law .relating to, a judgment in a civil action; and it may be
enforced like any other judgment of the court in which it is entered.
Id. at § 1287.4.
100. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 233, 174 P.2d 441,
448 (1946) (affirming a confirmation order of an arbitral award in a dispute arising from a
shipping contract); Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 3d 603, 609, 204 P.2d 23, 26 (1986)
(confirmation of arbitral award in contractor licensing dispute).
101. Cecil v. Bank of Am., 142 Cal. App. 2d 249, 251, 298 P.2d 24, 25 (1956) (af-
firming court order to disallow arbitration costs incurred pursuant to the arbitration agreement
in a contract dispute).
102. Loving, 33 Cal. 2d at 609, 204 P.2d at 26.
103. Inter-insurance Exch. v. Bailes, 219 Cal. App. 2d 830, 836, 33 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537
(1963) (affirming judgment confirming arbitral award in favor of an insurer in automobile
accident policy coverage dispute).
104. The Act provides for appealable orders:
(a) An order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration;
(b) An order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or vacate an award;
(c) An order vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered;
(d) A judgment entered pursuant to this title;
(e) A special order after final judgment.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1294 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
105. Pacific Vegetable Oil, 29 Cal. 2d at 232-33, 174 P.2d at 448.
106. See Goossen v. Adair, 185 Cal. App. 2d 810, 822-23, 8 Cal. Rptr. 855, 863 (1960)
(upholding modification and confirmation of an arbitral award which divided a broker's com-
mission between realtors).
107. Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 168, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1960) (up-
holding affirmation of arbitrators award in favor of an architect in a construction contract
dispute); Frantz v. Inter-Insurance Exch., 229 Cal. App. 2d 269, 273, 40 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221
(1964) (confirming affirmed arbitral award in an automotive liability policy dispute).
108. Gerard v. Salter, 146 Cal. App. 2d 840, 846, 304 P.2d 237, 242 (1956) (reversing
in part and confirming in part an award by a "board of arbitrators under a building contract
dispute respecting extras and other matters." d.).
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In summary, there are virtually no procedural safeguards guar-
anteed in common arbitration. There are no formal pleading re-
quirements or pretrial procedures. Trials are not presided over by
judge or jury and rules of evidence are not required. Decisions are
not necessarily made according to law, and the right of appeal is
virtually non-existent in most cases. While California's General Ar-
bitration Act provides some safeguards, such safeguards do not spe-
cifically deter unwarranted and/or excessive punitive damage awards
as adequately as the procedural requirements in civil and criminal
courts.
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are extra, or penalty damages, awarded to a
claimant in addition to compensatory damages, where the defend-
ant's conduct has been either fraudulent, malicious or oppressive n
The possibility of punitive damages awards to claimants is one of the
major reasons eleven states have refused to pass modern arbitration
acts."' The ensuing discussion contrasts the public policy arguments
supporting punitive damages with those used to prohibit punitive
damage awards.
1. Public Policy Arguments Supporting Punitive Damage
Awards
Punitive damages in civil litigation proceedings are awarded in
appropriate circumstances in all but four states."' Four general ra-
tionales are used to support punitive awards: revenge," 8 deterrence
and punishment," 4 compensation, 5 and the "private attorney gen-
eral" approach."'
109. Sage & Co., 138 Cal. App. at 496, 32 P.2d at 673.
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §
3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987).
111. See AAA, supra note 18, at 10. States with modern arbitration statutes include:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 147.
112. Comment, supra note 1, at 317-18 (these states are Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska and Washington). See also Belli, supra note 59, at 4.
113. Belli, supra note 59, at 5.
114. Id. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 318. See generally Mallor & Roberts,
Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1980).
115. Belli, supra note 59, at 6.
116. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 650. See also Belli, supra note 59, at 6.
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The revenge element of punitive damages prevents "private ret-
ribution." ' The plaintiff achieves vindication and abstains from
self-help by increasing the defendant's burden of damages."' Al-
though this perspective is often criticized, it has been a justification
for punitive damages for over a century." 9
Deterring and punishing socially unacceptable behavior is the
most common use for punitive damage awards.'2 Such awards ex-
press a community's disapproval of socially unacceptable behavior by
punishing the specific wrongdoer in an effort to deter him and
others.' 21 The degree of unacceptable behavior, evidenced by the
wrongdoer's state of mind, is one consideration in determining
whether punitive damages are warranted.' 22
An additional factor in discerning which conduct gives rise to
punitive damages is whether another remedy already exists which
achieves the goal of punitive awards.'2 " Punitive damages fulfill a
compensatory function 2 " in cases where criminal remedies are rarely
pursued. 2 In these instances punitive damages function as a substi-
tute and not a duplication of criminal prosecution, 6 thus refuting
the argument that punitive damages are an imposition of double
punishment. 2
Claimants assume the "private attorney general" role in in-
stances where it ordinarily would be too expensive to take action,
leaving the deterrence objective unaccomplished. 28 The availability
of punitive damage awards encourages members of society to take
legal action against wrongdoers whose conduct is usually not prose-
cuted.' 29 Potential recovery of more than ordinary damage awards is
a big incentive to initiate proceedings to punish unacceptable
117. Belli, supra note 59, at 5.
118. P.D. Defendant, supra note 9, at 408 n.l.
119. Id. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 650.
120. Belli, supra note 59, at 6. See generally Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 641.
121. Comment, supra note 1, at 318.
122. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 651.
123. Id.
124. Belli, supra note 59, at 6. See also Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doc-
trine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 875 (1976).
125. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 656 (examples of rarely prosecuted criminal
violations include libel, slander, trespass, and technical batteries). See Note, The Imposition of
Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158,
1175-76 (1966) [hereinafter Imposition].
126. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 656.
127. Id. at 655.
128. Id. at 649-50.




2. Public Policy Arguments Against Punitive Damage
Awards
The general consensus among commentators opposing punitive
damages is that these awards, outside of criminal proceedings, are
offensive to public policy. " ' Critics condemn punitive damage
awards in litigation and arbitration because of the penal nature of
the remedy. "' They claim that punishment should be applied only
to criminal violations and prosecuted only in the criminal arena. "8
Because double jeopardy principles are normally only applied to
criminal law, they would not preclude subsequent civil actions."'
Thus, wrongdoers may be subject to both criminal and civil
damages.'
Punitive damages can be a "windfall" for the civil plaintiff.8 6
In addition, deterrence, the "primary objective of punitive awards,"
is often considered ineffective and thus eliminates the justification for
awarding punitive damages.'8 7
A strong argument against punitive damage awards is that civil
litigants should not be subject to punitive liability without the same
constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards present in criminal
proceedings. "8 The potential magnitude of the awards and their pu-
nitive origins are strong arguments for including safeguards, similar
to those provided in civil and criminal law, in all arbitrations where
punitive damages are claimed. " 9
130. See Belli, supra note 59, at 6.
131. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976). See also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 644-45. These commentators do not
always distinguish between punitive damage awards in arbitration proceedings and those in
civil proceedings. This comment assumes that the arguments apply to both dispute resolution
systems.
132. Comment, supra note 1, at 320.
133. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 644.
134. Imposition, supra note 125, at 1181.
135. Id. See also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 645, 655.
136. Comment, supra note 1, at 320. Punitive damages are a "windfall" for the plain-
tiff because strict compensation is considered the only just remedy and damages assessed for
punishment purposes should be paid to the government. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 114, at 644.
139. P.D. Defendant, supra note 9, at 428 n.99. Examples of excessive fines leading to
the commentator's suggestion that the right to jury trial and increased burdens of proof should
always be present where penal judgments are made: $100 actual with $14,900 punitive dam-
ages, Bangert v. Hubbard, 127 Ind. App. 579, 126 N.E. 2d 778 (1955), and $1,250 actual
with $25,000 punitive damages, Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255, 276 (1925).
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3. California's Punitive Damage Policy
California supports the legitimacy of punitive damage awards
in litigation.140 The California Legislature maintains that punitive
damages serve the important functions of deterring and punishing
wrongdoers for engaging in socially unacceptable conduct. 4
California courts do not liberally award punitive damages, 4"
such damages are awarded only in "appropriate circumstances."""
A California Court of Appeal recently extended the category of "ap-
propriate circumstances," to include medical malpractice arbitration
awards. In Baker v. Sadick,'" the court concluded that "punitive
damages which may be asserted in a court of law may also be as-
serted under [an] arbitration clause . . . where the issue is submitted
by [the weaker party] or . . .with consent of both parties. '45
C. Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Baker v. Sadick
The Baker court unanimously upheld an arbitration decision
which awarded punitive damages against a doctor in a medical mal-
practice arbitration. 46 The conflict arose out of an unsuccessful
breast reduction surgery performed on Ms. Baker by Dr. Sadick. 4"
Plastic surgery was ultimately required to correct the effects of post
surgery infection.' 48 The award of punitive damages was deemed ap-
140. The California Civil Code provides for "exemplary damages" as follows: "(a) In
an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987) (enacted in 1872).
141. California has statutorily justified punitive damage awards in litigation for over
100 years. Id. See Comment, supra note I, at 320. Courts have also readily supported this
policy: "the purpose of punitive damages is to penalize [the wrongdoer's conduct] in the fu-
ture." Id. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 790, 598 P.2d 45, 55, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 402 (1979); "[T]he principal purpose of punitive damages is to deter and pun-
ish .. " Id. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237, 243 (1980). See Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
142. Comment, supra note 1, at 321.
143. Comment, supra note 1 at 313, 319, 322. See also Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979) (punitive damages awarded to
punish insurer for breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to
properly investigate insurance claims); Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 87
Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970) (punitive damages were awarded to deter corporate policy of repossess-
ing automobiles despite bona fide claims of ownership by third parties).
144. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 631, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
147. Id. at 621, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
148. Id.
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propriate after analyzing four factors: (1) the "specific arbitration
language of the arbitration agreement at issue . . . against the back-
drop of the overall nature of arbitration agreements;" (2) the "scope
of the arbitrator's powers;" (3) public policy arguments favoring ar-
bitration; and (4) policy issues surrounding punitive damage
awards.149
In analyzing the first factor, the court of appeals found that to
determine whether a dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement,
arbitrators will look at the parties' intent in regard to "the usual and
ordinary meaning of the contractual language and the circumstances
under which the agreement was made."' 0 An analysis of the parties'
intent requires determining whether the arbitration clause is broad
or narrow.' 5" Broad arbitration clauses generally indicate an expec-
tation, by all parties, that any and all disputes are covered in the
arbitration clause and thus empower arbitrators to grant any remedy
not expressly excluded. "2 A narrow arbitration clause is used to
strictly limit the scope of arbitration to issues "arising under the
contract."' 53
The Baker decision upholds a strong judicial preference for ar-
bitration over litigation15 4 to resolve commercial disputes. This deci-
sion indicates that California courts are reluctant to review arbi-
trability'" determinations of specific agreements especially when the
arbitration clause is broad."' This reluctance to review arbitrability
issues stems from the court's finding that parties have the "power to
control the scope of arbitration by the terms of their agreement."' 5 "
The option to use a narrow arbitration clause and expressly exclude
certain disputes from arbitration while maintaining the right to liti-
gate those exclusions exists for all parties stipulated in the
149. Id. at 623, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
150. Id. at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
151. AAA, supra note 18, at 20, 36-37 (distinguishing between broad and narrow arbi-
tration clauses).
152. Id. at 20. A typical broad arbitration clause is one in which the parties agree to
arbitrate any dispute(s) "arising out of or relating to the contract." d.
153. Id. at 21.
154. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 680. See also supra notes 19-21, 23-25
,and accompanying text.
155. The issue of arbitrability is whether or not a given dispute falls within the agree-
ment to arbitrate. See Workable Rule, supra note 22, at 278. Bankruptcy remains as one of
the few areas of law where the courts summarily void arbitration agreements. Until recently,
securities and anti-trust claims also fell into this category. Hollering, supra note 30, at 19, 20,
23.
156. Baker, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
157. Id. at 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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contract.158
An analysis of the contracting circumstances under which the
broad or narrow arbitration clause was drafted necessarily involves
the issue of bargaining power between contracting parties. Three
sub-issues require attention:' (1) whether consent to the arbitration
clause was voluntarily given by both contracting parties;1 59
(2) whether the terms were presented without an alternative; and
(3) whether both parties had knowledge of the term in the case of
form agreements.1 60 Parties cannot be made to submit issues to arbi-
tration if they did not voluntarily agree in writing.161
Since the arbitration agreement in Baker involved a standard-
ized contract form, the court had to consider whether there was a
notice problem to the "weaker party." '62 The general rule is that
any ambiguities in standard form agreements are "resolved against
the draftsman."1 6' The Baker court concluded that when a punitive
damage claim is submitted in an arbitration agreement by the
weaker party or with consent of both parties, the claim will be up-
held by a reviewing court.1 64
The court then focused on the arbitrator and found that the
scope of an arbitrator's powers are determined by the arbitration
agreement. 6 It was decided that if ambiguities are present in the
scope of arbitration, they "are resolved in favor of coverage." '166 Ar-
158. Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that "[a] party who consents to the inclusion in a contract of a limited arbitration clause does
not thereby waive his right to a judicial hearing on the merits of a dispute not encompassed
within the ambit of the clause." Id.); Willoughby Roofing, 598 F. Supp. at 365. (The court
held that the contract's arbitration clause was broad enough to empower the arbitration panel
to award punitive damages and public policy did not prohibit parties from vesting the arbitra-
tion panel with authority to consider punitive damages claims in a dispute arising out of a
breach of a roofing contract).
159: Adhesion contracts, in which an arbitration term is unfairly imposed by reason of
disparity in bargaining power, often occur in cases of hospital/medical malpractice, real estate
transactions, insurance, retail sales and banking. MARKS, supra note 26, at 47 (characterizing
adhesion contracts). See also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality
& the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 235-38 (1977) (describing situations
where adhesion contracts are prevalent). Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforce-
ment of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 990-91 (1972).
160. See Baker for an illustration of how the court addressed these same issues. 162 Cal.
App. 3d at 625-27, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681. See also infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
161. Davis, 667 F.2d at 165.
162. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 625-26, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The court described the
"weaker party" as the one who did not draft the arbitration agreement.
163. Id. at 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
164. Id. at 627, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
165. Id. at 623, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
166. Id.
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bitration awards will be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds the powers
specified in the agreement, but arbitration agreements are construed
liberally, and orders to vacate are rare. 67
In support of its decision, the appellate court relied on Califor-
nia's strong public policy favoring quick arbitration settlements with
minimal court interference.' 6 The court held that to be an effective
substitute for litigation, arbitration remedies must not be more lim-
ited than what can be asserted in court.169 Thus, the California
Court of Appeals chose not to follow other jurisdictions which hold,
per se, that an arbitrator does not have the power to award punitive
damages because it violates public policy. 70 The decision in Baker
illustrates the California court's refusal to rule ipsofacto that substi-
tuting arbitration for litigation would foreclose the remedy of puni-
tive damages.' 7 '
The appellate court concluded that public policy favors "arbi-
trated settlements of . . .claims, to the extent authorized by an ap-
propriate arbitration clause.'' 72  The "appropriate arbitration
clause" standard, according to the court, results from balancing the
four Baker factors previously discussed. Arguably the Baker decision
creates a test to guide arbitrators in determining whether or not the
"appropriate circumstances" exist for imposing penal liability. Im-
plementing this test is the only existing safeguard to prevent arbi-
trary imposition of unwarranted and/or excessive punitive damages.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
California's public policies advocating both arbitration and pu-
nitive damages make it plausible that punitive damage liability will
be extended from medical malpractice cases to commercial arbitra-
tion situations.'17 The problem with extending Baker is that it is
highly unlikely that the "appropriate arbitration clause" standard.
will be an effective safeguard against unjust penal liability.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
169. Id.
170. Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). The New
York court held that allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages would usurp the power of
the courts to be the sole determiner of penal liability. Id.
171. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Construction, textiles, maritime, real estate transactions, insurance, banking and
retail sales are examples of commercial arbitration situations where punitive damage liability
may be extended.
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A. Inadequate Punitive Damages Standard
The "appropriate arbitration clause" standard is inadequate for
three reasons. First, traditional substantive judicial standards for de-
cision making cannot be imposed on the arbitration process without
changing its flexible nature. Second, California legislation lacks clear
guidelines for making fair punitive damage awards in arbitration.
Third, the Baker decision implies that judicial review of punitive
damage awards is illusory. The manner in which the aforementioned
reasons create an inadequate punitive damages standard resulting in
highly ineffective safeguards against unjust liability is explained in
the following discussion.
1. Judicial Standards & Arbitration
The assumption that judge-made law will be followed in arbi-
tration proceedings is too presumptuous. The primary guidelines for
granting punitive damages in arbitration are discretionary principles
of equity and justice. 174 Statutory and common law do not require
adherence to legal principles in arbitration.' 7 ' Furthermore, the fact
that arbitration proceedings are private and opinions are rarely writ-
ten, sometimes even discouraged,1 71 prevents arbitrators from relying
on punitive damage standards used in other state arbitration pro-
ceedings, much less the standards used by courts.
2. Cumbersome Legislation
California legislation and judicially created law hinder fair pu-
nitive damage determinations. The judiciary's reluctance to interject
itself into arbitration proceedings magnifies the lack of and need for
discovery in large and/or complex arbitration disputes.' 77 The pro-
cedural structure of arbitration, as set out in the General Arbitration
Act, should aid arbitrators in acquiring information for effective de-
cision making. However, arbitrators cannot enforce discovery orders
for disputes other than those involving death or injury by wrongful
or negligent conduct.'7 8 Enforceable discovery procedures are needed
174. See supra text accompanying note 84.
175. See supra text accompanying note 84.
176. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 26.
177. Willenken, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, 6 LITIGATION 16 (1980) (mentioning
the Interim Report of the Maritime Law Association's Standing Committee on Arbitration
which "noted a trend toward greater recognition of the need for discovery in large or compli-
cated arbitrations." Id.).
178. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1283.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 27
1987] PUNITIVE DAMAGES
to -reduce the number of hearings1"" and the risks attending inade-
quate development of facts at those hearings.18 Enforcement of such
procedures will allow adequate development of facts, and therefore
fair punitive damage calculations.
3. Judicial Review
An additional area of California law leaves arbitrating parties
open to excessive and/or unwarranted penal sanctions without resort
to judicial review. California Civil Code section 3294 allows punitive
damages only for "the breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract" (i.e. where there is actual damage or injury). 8' Section 3294
necessitates a finding of fraudulent, oppressive or malicious con-
duct.1 2 However, the area of law dealing with breach of contract
accompanied by independent torts and/or fraudulent conduct is still
unsettled. 8  Court decisions are inconsistent"" and have resulted in
increasing the defendant's scope of potential liability by extending
the availability of punitive damages in contract cases on the theory
that the wrong itself is not just a breach of contract but also a tort. 8
Ironically, discovery requests are not enforceable in arbitrated
contractual disputes and California court have been unsympathetic
to pleas for exception due to extraordinary circumstances.' 6 It is
179. Willenken, supra note 177, at 18.
180. Id.
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). See Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 114, at 660.
182. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987). See Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 114, at 661.
183. Sullivan, supra note 159, at 235-38; Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Stan-
dard Oil, Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Koehrer v. Superior
Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
California Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987).
184. Inconsistencies are illustrated by the following opinions: In the landmark case of
Seaman's, the court recognized that a tort remedy is proper in commercial contracts where a
party in bad faith denies the existence of a contract. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at
1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Koehrer limited the Seaman's decision where it noted that "while
the court in Seaman's stated it was not necessary to base its decision on the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing [citations omitted], it is difficult otherwise to understand its
repeated reference to 'good faith' and 'bad faith' and a number of commentators suggest that
the decision must be understood as resting at least on one aspect of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829. In
Multiplex, the court held that not every breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a contract gives rise to a tort claim in addition to a contract claim. Multiplex, 189
Cal. App. 3d at 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
185. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. See Sulli-
van, supra note 159, at 248.
186. McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d 166, 171, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349
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reasonable to suggest, therefore, that arbitrators may have difficulty
abiding by California Civil Code section 3294 if the courts make
inconsistent rulings in the aforementioned area of contract law. Con-
sequently, arbitrating parties could be increasingly exposed to severe
punitive liability.The Baker decision implies that parties who mutually agree to
submit the issue of punitive damages to arbitration and subsequently
have punitive damages awarded against them will have little if any
chance for judicial review. The implication arises through the fol-
lowing reasoning. The Baker court found that broad arbitration
clauses which are mutually agreed upon fulfill the "appropriate ar-
bitration clause" standard.187 If the standard is met, the courts are
more apt to defer to the Baker court's wisdom' and deny review. The
policy strictly limiting judicial review of arbitral awards,188 com-
bined with deference to the "appropriate arbitration clause," makes
it less likely that parties who mutually agree in broad arbitration
clauses to submit the issue of punitive damages will receive judicial
review. This result contradicts arbitration's goal of fairness, espe-
cially if there is a complex breach of contract dispute, not involving
injury or death, where formal discovery procedures are not available.
In summary, serious injustices may occur if punitive damage
awards in arbitration are extended without revising California law.
Since punitive damage awards are a recent occurrence in California
arbitration proceedings, arbitrators are relatively inexperienced at
making such awards. The combination of very unsettled areas of
contract law providing the basis for punitive damage liability, and an
inability to enforce discovery of essential facts creates greater poten-
tial for inaccurate arbitration awards. Minimal rights to seek judicial
review of these awards increases exposure to potentially excessive
and/or unwarranted punitive damages.
B. Impact of Inadequate Punitive Damages Standard
Resolving the problems associated with the recent introduction
of punitive damages in California arbitration proceedings requires
mention of the impact on this alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism - and on society in general - if statutory procedural modifi-
(1963). The court refused to order a deposition because it would be incompatible with the
established policy of settling arbitrations speedily if courts were permitted to interfere with
arbitration.
187. See supra notes 149-72 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 56-59, 88-109 and accompanying text.
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cations are not made. Unwarranted and/or excessive punitive dam-
age awards undercut the advantages associated with arbitration, such
as reduced court loads and speedier resolution of disputes. Citizens
may prefer to resort to civil litigation, where procedural safeguards
exist, rather than resolving their disputes in an environment where
the potential prevalence of unwarranted and/or excessive punitive
damages awards is great.' 89
An even more drastic result is the possibility, due to the private
nature of arbitration, that unjust punitive damage awards will be
indeterminable by reviewing courts. 9" The fact that arbitration is
more accessible, and usually costs less than litigation, increases the
chance that poorer citizens may be forced into a process that is less
fair than litigation due to insufficient procedural safeguards which
cannot protect against undiscoverable punitive damage awards.' 9 '
The danger of such injustices could severely undermine arbitration
as a viable alternative dispute resolution process. The efforts taken to
assure adequate procedural safeguards exist in criminal and civil
systems suggest that the legal community should consider the follow-
ing proposal.
IV. PROPOSAL
Arbitration can remain an effective substitute for litigation. The
following proposal is designed to maintain the distinct nature of the
arbitration proceeding while making it fairer for parties when puni-
tive damage claims are submitted. 9 ' This proposal calls for institut-
ing a two-tiered arbitration process.' 9 ' The existence of a punitive
damages claim in the arbitration submission agreement determines
189. R. COULSON, supra note 3, at 13. Litigation emphasizes judicial review. The re-
view process should correct mistakes. This procedure protects parties against excessive and/or
unwarranted errors. Arbitrating parties rely on their selection of "impartial" and "wise" arbi-
trators to protect their interests because judicial review rights are waived. Parties choose arbi-
tration instead of litigation because they prefer an informed award which is intended to be
final. If the final result is excessive or unwarranted citizens may decide that the advantages of
arbitration do not outweigh the disadvantages. Id.
190. See MARKS, supra note 26, at 11.
191. Id. at 9. Adjudication is widely criticized because exorbitant litigation costs tend to
deny poorer citizens access to "the court-based, lawyer-dominated" traditional dispute resolu-
tion process. The results are often unfair when the more unfortunate society members do gain
access because litigation favors wealthier litigants who can afford competent representation. Id.
192. This proposal is not another attempt to create a "quasi-arbitration" process.
193. This two-tiered process is a conceptual scheme to ensure punitive damage submis-
sions are set out for special attention in the arbitration process. There is no actual physical
division between two types of arbitration. The special procedural safeguards for punitive dam-
age defendants would be incorporated into existing legislation.
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which tier parties will enter. Tier 1 is the "classic arbitration" pro-
ceeding for disputes not involving punitive damage claim submis-
sions. Tier 2 is "classic arbitration" plus additional formalities to
ensure necessary protections for those disputants submitting punitive
damage claims. In this proposal, Tier 2 is identified as "contempo-
rary arbitration."
"Contemporary arbitration" requires several amendments to
California's General Arbitration Act. Civil Procedure Code sections
1283.1, regarding enforceable discovery procedures; 1281.6, deter-
mining the appointment of arbitrators; and 1282, establishing the
powers and duties of neutral arbitrators are targeted for amendment
as demonstrated below.
A key element of section 1283.1 is Civil Procedure Code section
1283.05, addressing the manner of taking depositions and discovery
obtained in arbitration proceedings.19' Section 1283.05(b) gives arbi-
trators the power to enforce discovery procedures by imposing the
same sanctions and penalties as are enforced in civil courts." 5 Sec-
tion 1283.1(a) incorporates all the provisions of section 1283.05 and
makes them applicable to all arbitration agreements involving dis-
putes where death or injury occur.1 6
The proposed amendment to section 1283.1 would empower ar-
bitrators to enforce discovery procedures for disputes where parties
submit the issue of punitive damages to arbitration. Proposed statu-
tory language appears as follows within the context of the existing
legislation:
§ 1283.1 Incorporation of section 1283.05 in Arbitration
Agreements:
(a) All of the provision of Section 1283.05 shall be conclusively
deemed to be incorporated into, made a part of, and shall be
applicable to, every agreement to arbitrate any dispute, contro-
versy, or issue arising out of or resulting from an injury to, or
death of, a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of an-
other, as well as any dispute where punitive damages are
claimed. 19
Enforcement of arbitrator discovery orders would enhance ade-
194. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1283.05 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
195. Id.
196. Id. at § 1283.1.




quate development of facts. 9 ' Facts could be accumulated and evalu-
ated for their bearing on the punitive damages issue. Promoting
more precise punitive damage figures would leave less chance for ex-
cessive awards. Arbitrating parties would also have increased bur-
dens of proof, reducing the risk of unwarranted punitive damages
liability.
Contract disputes involving complex issues would be dealt with
fairly, decreasing the desirability of vacation petitions. Where the de-
sire to vacate still exists, discovery would facilitate the dispute reso-
lution process without slowing it down. Since appeals are taken from
orders to vacate, when there is no rehearing in arbitration, findings
of fact and law are made by the trial court."' If the trial court is
presented with the fruits of discovery from the arbitration proceed-
ing, it will be less necessary to order discovery at a later date.
Section 1281.6 of the California Civil Procedure Code also re-
quires amending. Currently this section allows arbitrating parties to
designate the number and type of arbitrators in all proceedings.2 00
The provision states that any method stipulated in the arbitration
agreement for appointing arbitrators shall be followed.20' In the ab-
sence of stipulation the court will make the appointment.0 '
Under the proposed two-tiered system, this provision for ap-
pointing arbitrators would remain the same except in punitive dam-
ages cases. The addition to section 1281.6 should provide for a
mandatory panel of three arbitrators in Tier 2 proceedings. Each
side of the dispute shall have the right to appoint one arbitrator. The
court, upon notice of the punitive damages claim, shall appoint the
third arbitrator from a panel of volunteer members of the legal com-
munity. The proposed changes to section 1281.6 would appear in the
following form:
§ 1281.6. Appointment of Arbitrator
(a) In all cases except where punitive damages claims are sub-
mitted, [if] the arbitration agreement provides a method of ap-
pointing an arbitrator, such method shall be followed. If the ar-
bitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing
an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration
198. See Willenken, supra note 179, at 18.
199. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1291 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). See also supra text
accompanying notes 97-109.
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and against whom arbitration is sought may agree on a method
of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed.
In the absence of an agreed method, or if the agreed method
fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitra-
tor appointed fails to act and his successor has not been ap-
pointed, the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration
agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator.
When a petition is made to the court to appoint a neutral
arbitrator, the court shall nominate five persons from a list of
persons supplied jointly by the parties to the arbitration or ob-
tained from a governmental agency concerned with arbitration.
The parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against
whom arbitration is sought may within five days of receipt of
notice of such nominees from the court jointly select the arbitra-
tor whether or not such arbitrator is among the nominees. If
such parties, fail to select an arbitrator within the five day pe-
riod, the court shall appoint the arbitrator from the nominees.
(b) Where punitive damage claims are submitted, a
mandatory panel of three arbitrators shall be chosen. Each
party has the option to appoint one neutral arbitrator to the
proceeding. The court shall nominate the third member of the
panel from the legal community upon notice of the punitive
damages claim. If any party fails to select an arbitrator within
five days from submitting notice to the court that a punitive
damages claim has been submitted, the court shall appoint the
remaining arbitrator(s).203
Finally, this proposal suggests that section 1282 of the Califor-
nia Civil Procedure Code needs an additional provision for a major-
ity decision on punitive damages claims. Section 1282 now provides
that the arbitration proceeding be presided over by a single neutral
arbitrator, unless otherwise proved by the arbitration agreement.
Amendments to this language are indicated within the context of the
statute below:
§ 1282 Exercise of Powers and Duties of Neutral Arbitrator
Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides, or
unless the parties to the arbitration otherwise provide by an
agreement which is not contrary to the arbitration agreement as
made or as modified by all of the parties thereto or unless there
is a punitive damages claim submission:
(a) The arbitration shall be by a single neutral arbitrator.
203. Id. (italics indicate the proposed addition).
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(b) If there is more than one arbitrator, the powers and
duties of the arbitrators, other than the powers and duties of a
neutral arbitrator, may be exercised by a majority of them if
reasonable notice of all proceedings has been given to all
arbitrators.
(c) If there is more than one neutral arbitrator:
(1) The powers and duties of a neutral arbitrator may be
exercised by a majority of the neutral arbitrators.
(2) By unanimous agreement of the neutral arbitrators,
such powers and duties may be delegated to one of their number
but the power to make or correct the award may be not so
delegated.
(d) If there is no neutral arbitrator, the powers and duties
of a neutral arbitrator may be exercised by a majority of the
arbitrators.
(e) If there is a punitive damages claim in the submission
agreement:
(1) A mandatory panel of three arbitrators shall be assem-
bled according to § 1281.6.
(2) The powers and duties of a neutral arbitrator shall be
exercised by a majority of the arbitrators.
(3) The punitive damages award shall be made by a ma-
jority decision204
A mandatory panel of three arbitrators and a majority verdict
requirement would prevent abuse of discretion by a single arbitrator.
Protecting against bias or abuse of discretion is vital in proceedings
where an award may exceed the severity of criminal punishment.
The court appointed arbitrator will provide an analysis from a
purely legal perspective. Arbitrators chosen by the parties will bring
their own areas of expertise to the forum. Together, the three arbi-
trators should provide a reasonable determination of punitive dam-
ages with the aid of enforceable discovery. Each arbitrator would act
as a check and balance against excessive and/or unwarranted dam-
age calculations by the other.
V. CONCLUSION
California's public policy favors arbitration as a substitute dis-
pute resolution process to adjudication. The advantages of arbitration
outweigh the disadvantages where punitive damages are not claimed.
However, the fairness of the arbitration process breaks down where
parties submit punitive damage claims. Baker permits parties dam-
204. Id. at § 1282. (italics indicates proposed addition).
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age awards in medical malpractice arbitration proceedings. If Baker
is extended to broader commercial arenas without additional legisla-
tive safeguards, such as those proposed in this comment, excessive
and/or unwarranted arbitral awards are more likely to result.
Through legislative reform of California's General Arbitration
Act, adoption of the proposed two-tiered arbitration concept should
result in fairer consequences when punitive damages claims are sub-
mitted to arbitration. Punitive damage calculations will be more ac-
curate with enforceable discovery procedures. A mandatory arbitra-
tion panel will ensure that the calculations are openly discussed and
evaluated by three experts. The award arising from this process is
less likely to be arbitrary and/or excessive. Thus, arbitration will




























































* Portions taken from Ladimer & Solomon,
Arbitration: Laws, Programs, Cases, 652
(1977).
Medical Malpractice
INS. L.J. 335, 336
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